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Abstract Greenhouse gas emission regulation and
renewable energy promotion policies have been imple-
mented in many countries. Yet these two kinds of regula-
tion policies have complex interactions between each
other, and can either enhance or reduce the overall emis-
sion reduction efficiency. If not well tuned, these regulation
policies may deviate from their original intention and lead
to unnecessary social cost. Hence, the policy effectiveness,
cost effectiveness, and dynamic efficiency of different
policy mixtures between emission trading and renewable
energy subsidy are studied based on a novel dynamic
simulation platform of power economy and power system.
Simulation results show that these two kinds of regulation
policy can coexist, but a good coordination between the
emission trading and the renewable energy subsidy can
achieve better emission reduction outcomes.
Keywords Dynamic simulation, Energy conservation,
Emission reduction, Emission trading, Renewable energy,
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1 Introduction
Recent years, the exhaustion of fossil energy and the
environmental concerns of pollutants emission have made
the energy conservation and emission reduction necessary.
The power industry, which has been relying on fossil fuel
as main primary energy for a long time, is emission
intensive. In order to reduce the dependence on fuel energy
and greenhouse gas emission, various regulation measures
have been proposed and implemented, which can be
roughly categorized into two kinds of greenhouse gas
emission regulation and renewable energy promotion.
Emission regulation and renewable energy promotion are
regulation measures in two aspects, yet aiming at the same
goal of achieving energy conservation and emission
reduction targets. Therefore, in addition to the physical
restrictions intrinsic to itself, power systems are nowadays
facing more constraints from external domains, such as
primary energy and emissions.
In [1], a novel concept, called the ‘‘generalized con-
gestions’’ was proposed to describe those factors affecting
both the competition level and the efficiency of power
markets. Market power is defined as the market partici-
pant’s capability to influence the market efficiency with the
aid of generalized congestions, and generalized market
power reflects its capability to influence the social welfare.
Regulation measures, like other generalized congestions,
could influence the energy and capital flows in power
systems. Thus, the regulation power is a special market
power, which can also reduce market efficiency if it is not
well designed.
In most countries, emission regulation and renewable
energy promotion coexist, in which complex interactions
are likely to happen. In [2], interactions between emission
regulation and renewable energy (RES) promotion were
categorized into direct interaction, indirect interaction, and
trading interaction. The detailed interaction model is
elaborated in this paper (shown in Fig. 1). If the interactive
modes or key parameters of these regulation measures are
adopted by ex-ante simulation evaluation, the unnecessary
policy risk and social cost losses may be avoided.
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2 Existing regulation policies for greenhouse gas
emission and renewable energy promotion
2.1 Regulation of greenhouse gas emission
Typical regulation methods are carbon tax and emission
trading (ET). Carbon tax is a Pigovian tax levied on the
carbon content of fuels [3]. The Australia government
introduced the carbon tax law in December 2011, which
forced about 300 of the worst-polluting firms to pay an AUD
$23 levy for every ton of greenhouse gases they produced.
The problem with carbon tax is to determine a proper tax rate.
The target of carbon tax is to internalize the externality of
emission, however the marginal externality cost is difficult to
be discovered. Emission trading is a market-based approach
to control the pollution by providing economic incentives for
achieving pollutant emission reductions. The basic meth-
odology of emission trading is Coase theorem, which solves
the externality problem by defining property rights and
market-based mechanisms. The emission trading is a dis-
covering process for marginal external cost. Theoretically, it
could achieve the emission reduction target in the most
efficient way when the transaction cost is near zero. Emission
Trading Scheme (ETS) has already been implemented in
many countries and districts, such as the Danish CO2 trading
program (from 2001 to 2003), UK ETS (from 2002 to 2006),
and EU ETS (2005). In [4], a detailed survey of EU ETS is
given, including the origins and history, the allocation of
allowances, the implications of competitiveness and the
distribution of costs and benefits, etc.
2.2 Renewable energy promotion
Regulation of greenhouse gas emissions will introduce
extra emission cost to fuel-based generation, which, to
some extent, will make renewable energy generation rela-
tively more competitive. However, researches show that
only if the carbon tax or the emission price is much higher
than the present value, can the renewable energy be truly
competitive. So, in many countries, various policies for
renewable energy promotion are applied to increase the
competitiveness of renewable energy directly. The existing
policies for renewable energy promotion can be catego-
rized into two kinds of ‘‘price driven’’ and ‘‘quantity dri-
ven’’ based on their different regulation targets, and
‘‘investment incentive’’ and ‘‘generation incentive’’ based
on their different incentive targets (shown in Table 1).
2.3 Existing research methods
In electricity market research, the major modelling
methods include optimization model based, game equilib-
rium model based and simulation model based. In [5], a state-
of-the-art review on modeling methods for decision making
optimization in the electricity spot market was given. When
studying the emission reduction related decision making
problems, similar modelling methods are adopted. In [6],
optimization model was used to investigate the effects of
emission constraints and emission trading scheme on the
generation scheduling outcome. In [7], Cournot equilibrium
model was used to analyze the potential profit impacts and
possible compensation of potential emission trading scheme
on generation companies. As for power system energy policy
studies, optimization and game equilibrium models are not
applicable since the target problem is too complicated and
comprises different market participants. Popular modelling
methods of the power system energy policies include the
computable general equilibrium (CGE) model and agent-
based computational economics (ACE) model. CGE models
are popular for policy analysis, which compromise of eco-
nomic models using actual economic data to estimate how an
economy might react to changes of policy, technology or
other external factors. CGE models have been widely used in
environmental policy researches to analyze the impact of
different emission allowance allocation methods on emis-
sion reduction effects [8] and the impact of EU-wide emis-
sion trading on the reduction cost [9]. The ACE model-based
method is to study the economics and emissions by evolving
systems of autonomous interacting agents [10]. ACE models
have been adopted to study the long-term impact of emission
trading on generation emissions [11, 12] and the design of
emission trading scheme [13], and the impact of the policies























Fig. 1 Interactions between renewable energy promotion and emis-
sion regulation
Table 1 Different mechanisms for renewable energy promotion
Incentive
mode
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3 Simulation tool and models
The dynamic simulation platform for power economy
and power system (DSPES) was first proposed in [15],
which is a novel simulation platform supporting multi-
criteria, multi-participant dynamic simulation. Based on
the dynamic model of power systems and power economy,
DSPES supports the experimental study of power industry,
providing quantitative risk analysis function and decision
support for different participants. In this paper, DSPES is
used for case studies. Mid-term simulation will be run to
obtain the simulation results in 1 year.
3.1 Generation model
1) Marginal cost of fossil fuel-based generator. The
marginal cost cf (€/MWh) for fossil fuel-based gen-
erator consists of marginal generation cost cfg and
marginal emission cost cfe (€/MWh)
cf ¼ cfg þ cfe ¼ pf=e þ pe  rfe; ð1Þ
where cfg ¼ pf=e, pf (€/ton) is the fuel price and e
(MWh/ton) is the efficiency; cfe ¼ pe  re; pe (€/ton)
is the emission price and rfe (ton/MWh) is the emission
rate.
2) Emission trading strategy. The emission trading
quantity qef; i; t of fossil fuel-based generator i at day t is
qef; i; t ¼ ei; t  bei  rlt ; ð2Þ
where ei,t is the emission quantity of generator i at day
t, bei is the emission allowance budget of generator i at
day t, and rlt is ratio of load level at day t with respect
to annual total load.
3) Marginal cost of renewable energy. The marginal cost
cr (€/MWh) for renewable energy is the marginal
generation cost crg (€/MWh) minus feed-in-tariff
subsidy pr (€/MWh) as follows
cr ¼ crg  pr: ð3Þ
3.2 Electricity market model
Generation Companies (GENCOs) will trade in the spot
electricity market on daily basis. Suppose that the demand
is inelastic and every unit reports their marginal cost.
Uniform clearing pricing method is adopted to clear the
market.
3.3 Emission market model
In this model, emission trading is carried out on daily
basis, and GENCOs are considered as price takers, who
report their everyday emission allowance demand to the
emission market. Daily emission price pe will then be
generated based on a ‘‘demand–price’’ model.
In this ‘‘demand–price’’ model, pet (emission price at
day t) is calculated based on an inference from the accu-
mulated emission allowance demand before day t to the
annual overall emission demand. Its basic principle is
illustrated in Fig. 2.
pet ¼ pe þ k
ð~eT  et1Þ  ðe  et1Þ

















where pe is the average price in emission market, k is the
emission price factor, et-1 is the accumulated emission
allowance demand before day t; ~eT is the inference value of
annual overall emission allowance demand based on et-1, e is
the preset annual overall emission cap and rlk is the daily load
proportion (in day k) with respect to annual overall load.
This emission market ‘‘demand–price’’ model tries to
simulate the annual emission price dynamics. Parameters in
this model has been tuned based on actual EU ETS emis-
sion market price statistics, pe is set to 20 €/ton, k is set to
1,000, and price cap and floor are set to 40 and 0 €/ton,
respectively.
The following case studies show that the model can
reasonably reflect the emission price dynamics.
3.4 Evaluation index
1) Social cost (SC). The social cost must be compre-
hensively evaluated, covering each kind of cost
incurred and possible social benefits. In this sense, at
least electricity purchasing cost (PC), subsidy (S), and
social benefits (B) should be considered. In this paper:
SC = PC ? S - B. It should be mentioned that,
usually the fiscal revenue of selling emission allow-
ance or the carbon tax will be used to encourage clean
energy development, which is the social benefits in
this paper.
Fig. 2 Basic principle of the ‘‘demand–price’’ model
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2) Overall emission (OE). The overall emission of the
whole system is used to evaluate the effectiveness of
policies, rather than the emission per MWh or per
GDP.
3) Cost efficiency (CE). Cost efficiency is needed to
compare the efficiency of one policy with another one.
CE = DOE/DSC, where DOE and DSC are the
increments of OE and SC, respectively.
Dynamic efficiency can be evaluated by the profit
accumulation of each kind of GENCO.
4 Case studies
IEEE 39-bus system is chosen for case studies, Fig. 3
shows the annual load curve, and three kinds of GENCO are
set in the system: high emission GENCO (HIGH) which
owns fossil fuel-based generators (mainly coal-based) with
high emission rate, low emission GENCO (LOW) which
owns fossil fuel-based generators (mainly gas-based) with
low emission rate, and renewable GENCO (RENEW-
ABLE) which owns renewable energy generators.
And in this paper, feed-in-tariff subsidy and emission
trading are selected as the typical renewable energy pro-
motion and emission regulation measures, respectively, as
shown in Fig. 4.
Six types of generator are considered in the case study
(shown in Table 2), among them there are three types of
coal-based generator, two types of gas-based generator, one
type of bio power plant, and one type of wind turbine. And
their distributions in a power system are shown in Table 3.
4.1 First case study: influences of emission regulation
strength
In the first case study, the policy of renewable energy
promotion is fixed, and the impact of different emission
regulation strengths will be evaluated by scenario
simulations.
In all scenarios, feed-in-tariff subsidy is set for renew-
able energy generators. Here, 50 % means that the subsidy
will cover 50 % of the renewable energy generator cost
(shown in Table 4).
Scenario 1 is set as the Business as Usual scenario. In
Scenarios 2–4, emission trading is implemented and the
percentage in Table 4 implicates its target of emission





































Fig. 4 Interaction model







COAL_A 360 20.0 0.85
COAL_B 200 25.0 1.00
COAL_C 80 30.3 1.20
GAS_A 240 32.0 0.35
GAS_B 50 50.0 0.70
BIO 80 60.0 0.00
WIND 1,500 70.0 0.00




30 COAL_B 9 1, COAL_C 9 1,
GAS_A 9 1, GAS_B 9 3
HIGH
32 COAL_B 9 2, GAS_A 9 3 LOW
33 GAS_A 9 2, GAS_B 9 2 LOW
34 COAL_C 9 4 HIGH
35 COAL_B 9 1, GAS_A 9 2,
GAS_B 9 1
LOW
36 COAL_B 9 4 LOW
37 COAL_C 9 4 HIGH
38 COAL_B 9 3, COAL_C 9 2 LOW
39 COAL_A 9 2 HIGH
39 BIO 9 6, WIND 9 1 RENEWABLE
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Then simulations are conducted on the simulation plat-
form DSPES, simulation results are shown in Table 5. It
can be found in Table 5 that in the aspect of all emissions
social cost, the simulation results of Scenario 1 are inferior
to that of Scenario 2, which is due to the absence of
emission regulation.
In Scenarios 2–4, as the regulation strength increases,
the total emissions decrease, while the social cost increa-
ses. Among them, Scenario 2 achieves the lowest social
cost, and the cost efficiency of Scenarios 3–4 is calculated
compared with Scenario 2. Scenario 3 obtains the best cost
efficiency (0.2513 ton/€), which means the reduction of
one more ton emission cost only €3.98.
So in this case study, considering the total emission reduc-
tion and cost efficiency, Scenarios 2 and 3 are better choices.
Figure 5 shows the profit accumulation for different
kinds of GENCO under each scenario.
As the emission regulation strengthens from Scenarios
1–4, more and more profit can be obtained for ‘‘RENEW-
ABLE’’ due to its relatively increased competitiveness,
which will stimulate more and more renewable generation
investments in the long run; profit accumulation for
‘‘HIGH’’ decreases due to the increase of extra emission
cost, its generators will at last act as the peak load units.
Profit accumulation for ‘‘LOW’’ will decrease at the
beginning (Scenarios 1–3), because the emission cost is not
high enough to compete with ‘‘HIGH’’, while the
‘‘RENEWABLE’’ get more market share. Then, the profit
accumulation increases from Scenarios 3–4, because now the
emission cost is high enough to compete with ‘‘HIGH’’.
Figures 6, 7, and 8 show the emission price dynamics (in
1 year) at different levels of emission regulation strength. The
tougher the regulation, the higher the average emission price is.
Table 5 Simulation results (first case study)
Scenario 1 2 3 4
Total emissions (ton 9 106) 1.4995 1.4245 1.3491 1.2656
Social cost (€ 9 106) 70.6 69.9 70.2 76.6
Emission reduction (%) 9 5.0 10.0 15.6
Cost efficiency (ton/€) 9 9 0.2513 0.0237
Table 4 Simulation scenarios (first case study)
Scenario 1 2 3 4
Target of emission reduction percentage (emission
trading) (%)
9 5 10 15
Percentage of feed-in-tariff subsidy referred to































































































Fig. 8 Emission price dynamics (Scenario 4)
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4.2 Second case study: influences of renewable energy
promotion strength
In the second case study, emission regulation policy is
fixed, and the impact of different renewable energy pro-
motion strengths is evaluated by simulation scenarios.
Scenario 2 in the first case study is chosen as a bench-
mark scenario in this case study. The change of renewable
energy promotion strength is reflected by different subsidy
percentages (shown in Table 6).
Compared with that of Scenario 2, the social cost
increases with the growth of subsidy percentage, but the
quantity of emission reduction is negligible (shown in
Table 7). Considering the cost efficiency, Scenarios 5–7
are inefficient.
In Scenario 5, due to insufficient renewable energy
promotion, renewable energy generators cannot compete
with fossil fuel-based generators. The latter will account
for large market share, and the demand for emission
allowance rises, leading to relatively high emission price
(shown in Fig. 9).
As the efforts to promote renewable energy generation
are enhanced in Scenarios 6 and 7, the excessive feed-in-
tariff will greatly enhance the competitiveness of renew-
able energy generators, which will cut the market share of
fossil fuel-based generators. Therefore, the demand for
emission allowance is lowered, and the emission price
goes down, which is zero during the majority time
(Figs. 10, 11).
In this case study, the excessive renewable energy pro-
motion will twist the emission price signal, which leads to
the ineffectiveness of the emission regulation. This is the
negative effect of the interaction between renewable
energy promotion and emission regulation.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, based on the simulation platform DSPES,
interactions between greenhouse gas emission regulation
and renewable energy promotion in electric power industry
are studied. The policy effect is evaluated by the social
cost, overall emission, cost efficiency, and the economic
incentive to different GENCOs. Case studies show that
neither emission regulation nor renewable energy promo-
tion can achieve the most efficient emission reduction
Table 6 Simulation scenarios (second case study)
Scenario 5 2 6 7
Target of emission reduction percentage
(emission trading) (%)
5
Percentage of feed-in-tariff subsidy referred to
renewable energy generator cost (renewable
energy promotion) (%)
25 50 75 100
Table 7 Simulation results (second case study)
Scenario 5 2 6 7
Total emissions (ton 9 106) 1.4233 1.4245 1.4195 1.4195
Social cost (€ 9 106) 71.2 69.9 77.8 82.5





































































Fig. 11 Emission price dynamics (Scenario 7)
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outcome alone. The two measures will coexist for a long
period of time. If not well designed, they will impose
negative effects on each other. In the case study, excessive
renewable energy promotion may twist the emission price,
thus leading to inefficient emission reduction. The DSPES
turns out to be a very useful tool for policy analysis, which
can be used as a ‘‘wind tunnel’’ before the implementation
of energy policies.
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